As with their terrestrial and aerial counterparts, uncrewed maritime systems (UMSs) or “sea drones” have rapidly proliferated to meet current and future defense needs on, over, and under the seas. Existing iterations of these systems have already proven their efficacy and will continue to present unique opportunities and novel legal issues for developers and operators in the U.S. and abroad.

Making a Splash: Recent Use-Cases

UMSs have featured in numerous recent and high-profile incidents. On July 12, 2026, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) announced that “multiple one-way attack surface drones” struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran, “marking the first time American forces have employed sea drones in combat operations.” Shortly after, Saronic Technologies confirmed that USCENTCOM had deployed the Saronic Corsair, a 24-foot autonomous surface vehicle (ASV), in that strike. The U.S. military had already deployed the Saronic Corsair in June to locate and rescue the crew of a downed helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz. The testing and demonstrations now underway take on added significance in light of these combat applications, which point toward roles in contested waters, patrol areas too hazardous for crewed vessels, and U.S. port security and national maritime protection more generally.

Beyond the United States, UMSs have played a critical role in Ukraine’s war with Russia. Although the Ukrainian Navy was largely destroyed in the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukrainian forces have damaged and even sunk Russian warships in the Black Sea using swarms of autonomous maritime vessels, decimating Russian naval power and crippling their supply lines. The Ukrainian defense industry has continued to develop more advanced autonomous vessels throughout the conflict, and in October 2025, Ukrainian defense officials announced an upgraded “Sea Baby” platform with a range of 930 miles and the capability to carry up to 4,400 pounds of payload. Ukrainian contractors have also since made forays into the U.S. defense market. Most recently, on July 22, 2026, UFORCE, maker of Ukraine’s Magura autonomous maritime system, announced its partnership with U.S. company RECONCRAFT to build more ASVs as part of the Arsenal of Freedom.

Maritime Autonomous Systems 101: Categories + Capabilities

UMSs typically fall into one of two categories: Uncrewed or Autonomous Surface Vessels (USVs or ASVs) or Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). USVs/ASVs operate solely on the water surface while UUVs can operate below the surface. Both categories of drones can conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, with USVs/ASVs focusing on surface, air, or land-based threats and UUVs focusing on submarines and mines. Both platforms can perform area denial operations and offensive strikes with lethal payloads.

Examples of USVs/ASVs include the Saildrone Spectre platform, which can be deployed for ISR and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or for strikes in contested environments; and the Saronic Corsair, which was deployed for the U.S. search and rescue mission in the Strait of Hormuz and again in the strike against the submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base. Existing UUV platforms support longer-term ISR and ASW operations and include the General Dynamics Bluefin Robotics models and the HII REMUS. On April 27, 2026, HII received an award from the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to deliver the REMUS system’s accompanying Torpedo Tube Launch and Recovery system, further integrating the REMUS system with U.S. Navy submarines. Additionally, Boeing has developed the Orca, an XLUUV (Extra Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle) designed to carry large payloads and support months-long, long‑range missions. Notably, the Orca is also designed to operate independent of a host-ship: it can launch and be recovered pier-side and without a dedicated support vessel, thus increasing deployment flexibility.

U.S. Policy Developments and Procurement Initiatives

Offices across the U.S. Department of War (DoW) have implemented policy reforms to encourage broader use of UMS with support from Congress. In September 2025, then-Secretary of the Navy John Phelan established the positions of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (DASN (RAS)), Program Executive Office for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (PEO RAS) and Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (PAE RAS) to support the procurement and deployment of “the most capable unmanned systems available.” Autonomous systems are also a key component of the Navy’s Hedge Strategy intended to establish and field a U.S. fleet that is lethal, resilient, global and can readily adapt to dynamic adversaries.

Additionally, drones are incorporated into the Navy’s most recent Fighting Instructions, and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle shared earlier this year that the Navy is considering a new Warfighting Development Center that specializes in training and deployment tactics for robotic and autonomous systems. DIU and the Navy are also launching a competition to expedite the development of containerized payloads on crewed and uncrewed surface vessels.

Separately, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is pursuing new autonomous maritime capabilities. USSOCOM recently published a solicitation seeking industry partners for its Advancing Naval Capabilities through Holistic Opportunities and Resources (ANCHOR) Initiative, which aims to use other transaction agreements (OTAs) to develop prototype solutions related to six focus areas: unmanned systems; counter-unmanned systems; command, control, communications, computer, cyber, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C5ISR); “scalable effects”; human performance; and human-machine teaming. USSOCOM has also worked with the SOFWERX innovation hub on market research to find producers of “mountable single payloads that process and geolocate Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) in complex maritime environments.” Prototype OTAs permit negotiated intellectual property terms in place of the default DFARS data rights allocation, and a successfully completed prototype can transition to follow-on production without further competition. The terms agreed at the prototype stage therefore can determine who controls the technology when it scales.

The U.S. military’s appetite for UMSs continues to grow and shows no sign of slowing. In its version of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed the creation of a new combatant command, Robotic and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command (RASCOM) in Senate Bill S. 4784, Section 917. Currently, the House Armed Services Committee’s version H.R. 8800 does not include this language.

Finally, the United States is also collaborating with its allies to jointly develop autonomous maritime capabilities. On May 30, 2026, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announced a project to develop cutting-edge payloads and enabling systems for each country’s Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) as part of the AUKUS partnership’s Pillar II efforts to develop advanced military capabilities. The project is intended to enhance the countries’ ability to protect critical national seabed infrastructure; deploy cutting edge surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities; conduct logistics operations; and bolster superiority in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, mine countermeasures, electronic warfare, and contested littoral maneuver. The AUKUS partners aim to deliver the first payloads in 2027. Contractors from allied states have also recently announced partnerships with established U.S. firms to pursue U.S. work. Like with UFORCE and RECONCRAFT, Saronic and Samsung Heavy Industries have publicized their strategic partnership to marry Saronic’s UMS manufacturing know-how with Samsung’s shipbuilding and product automation capabilities to produce dual-use UMSs.

These cross-border arrangements carry regulatory obligations that attach well before any contract is signed. Foreign participation in UMS development implicates ITAR and EAR classification of the platform, its autonomy software, and its payloads; foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) analysis where the U.S. partner holds or seeks a facility clearance; and CFIUS jurisdiction over foreign investment in businesses producing critical technologies. Each of these can constrain deal structure, and each can take months to resolve.

Emerging Legal Frameworks and Considerations for Contractors

The rapid development of UMSs has led national and international regulatory bodies to start to set guardrails on military and civilian applications of the technology. There are also existing legal frameworks which may impose restrictions without explicitly regulating sea drones.

Lethal UMS Use

As discussed in Fluet’s previous insight “AI Priorities Focus on Defense + Intelligence Agencies,” the Trump Administration’s recent National Security Presidential Memorandum-11 (NSPM-11) ordered the Secretary of War to update within 90 days, placing the revision due date in September 2026, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.09 (“Autonomy in Weapon Systems”) to “ensure the deliberate adoption of AI systems that respect the chain of command and operational authorities.” More specifically, DoDD 3000.09 sets out the internal processes and responsibilities for the development, acquisition, testing, and use of autonomous weapons systems by DoW, including those with AI capabilities as well as “semi-autonomous weapons systems” which use autonomy to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by an operator. The directive also requires autonomous weapons system operators to adhere to “the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE).” Whether the revision tightens or relaxes existing review thresholds, contractors developing lethal maritime autonomy should expect to re-baseline their legal review timelines against it.

Non-Lethal UMS Use

For non-lethal UMS used in military and civilian roles, existing national and international regulatory frameworks offer guidance on integrating autonomous platforms into conventional maritime operations. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for regulating vessels, including autonomous vessels, but the agency has not adopted new regulations on this subject since promulgating 46 C.F.R. § 15.715 in 1987. While the FY 2023 NDAA did authorize a Coast Guard pilot program to deploy autonomous vessels for at-sea recovery of spaceflight components, Coast Guard officials have testified before Congress to seek support for more comprehensive regulatory reforms. In recent years, other countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway have adopted regulations specifically governing autonomous and semi-autonomous vessels, which have been cited favorably by U.S. officials.

Separately, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations’ specialized agency responsible for maritime safety, adopted a new International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS Code) in May 2026 and effective in July 2026. The MASS Code contains provisions on a wide range of issues, including safety of navigation in compliance with Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and other international instruments; concept of operations; and baseline software requirements for autonomous platforms. Notably, the Code does not apply to warships and other government-owned or operated vessels, and it reaches only cargo ships covered by SOLAS Chapter I, generally vessels above 500 gross tons on international voyages, with application to smaller platforms merely recommended. A 24-foot ASV falls outside the Code on both counts. Although this legal framework is non-binding, with a mandatory version targeted for adoption by 2030 and entry into force on January 1, 2032, it signifies an international consensus on regulating autonomous vessels and integrating them into the maritime environment.

Contractor-Specific Issues

Simultaneously, the body of contractor-specific legal issues continues to grow in parallel with the development of these new technologies. As with the adoption and deployment of unmanned aerial systems, there are live questions as to who will be liable for accidents or other adverse outcomes arising from UMS use. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hencely v. Fluor Corp., which held that state-law tort claims against a military contractor are not preempted where the federal government neither required nor authorized the challenged conduct, may present unique legal challenges to contractors developing the software or physical platforms for lethal UMSs. That standard is difficult to satisfy for autonomous systems, where the government does not direct each individual engagement. All UMSs face the risk of communications failures with operators through internal errors or electronic warfare tactics such as spoofing or jamming. A recent incident where a Ukrainian maritime drone exploded in a Romanian port after its operators lost control highlights this danger. In a similar scenario, U.S. courts hearing a wrongful death or other tort suit would have to grapple with assigning fault—the company who created the autonomous capability and platform or the government personnel who deployed it (or allowed it to deploy itself)—and whether traditional concepts of derivative sovereign immunity or preemption protect contractors when these systems malfunction or lead to dangerous outcomes. Until those questions are settled, risk allocation will happen in the contract rather than in regulation. Indemnification provisions, third-party liability coverage, and, for certain applications, SAFETY Act designation or certification are the tools available to contractors today.

Key Takeaways for Contractors

  1. Watch for the DoDD 3000.09 revision in September 2026. Whichever direction it moves, program schedules will need re-baselining against it. Build legal review lead time in now rather than absorbing it later.
  2. Address export controls and foreign ownership before the partnership finalization. Cross-border UMS ventures raise ITAR and EAR classification, FOCI mitigation, and CFIUS questions that can take months to resolve and that can constrain deal structure once identified.
  3. Allocate risk by contract. With no comprehensive domestic rule and no applicable international code, indemnification, insurance, and liability provisions are doing the work that regulation is not.
  4. Watch the MASS Code for directional guidance but not regulatory requirements. It excludes warships and government vessels, reaches only larger commercial ships, and remains non-binding until at least 2032. Domestic regulatory gaps will likely remain for the near future.
  5. Document what the government specified and authorized. After Hencely, preemption and derivative immunity defenses turn on whether the government required or authorized the conduct at issue. Preserving requirements documents, approved specifications, test acceptance records, and every warning given to the government about the limits of the autonomous capability will help to limit future liability.
  6. Negotiate intellectual property at the OTA, not after. Prototype OTAs permit tailored data rights and a follow-on production path, which together can let a contractor retain considerably more than the default DFARS allocation.

Bottom Line

Combat-proven systems are being fielded into something of a regulatory vacuum, and that gap is not likely to close in the near future. By the time a program is under contract, most of the risk has already been allocated. The programs that reach production are often the ones where that happened deliberately and in line with the business and programmatic objectives, with the export, ownership, and IP questions answered before signature rather than discovered after it. Fluet’s Government Contracts and International Trade teams have decades of combined experience helping companies pursue these opportunities while managing the legal and compliance challenges hidden in murky waters.